Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 54, Issue 1 (Fall 2016)

Article 8

Book Review: Law’s Religion: Religious Difference
and the Claims of Constitutionalism by Benjamin
L. Berger
Howard Kislowicz
University of New Brunswick, Howard.Kislowicz@unb.ca

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Part of the Law Commons
Book Review

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
Citation Information
Kislowicz, Howard. "Book Review: Law’s Religion: Religious Difference and the Claims of Constitutionalism by Benjamin L. Berger"
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 54.1 (2016) : 291-298.

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.

Book Review: Law’s Religion: Religious Difference and the Claims of
Constitutionalism by Benjamin L. Berger
Abstract

This is a book review of Law’s Religion: Religious Difference and the Claims of Constitutionalism by Benjamin L
Berger.

This book review is available in Osgoode Hall Law Journal: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol54/iss1/8

291

Book Review

Law’s Religion: Religious Difference
and the Claims of Constitutionalism, by
Benjamin L. Berger1
HOWARD KISLOWICZ2
BENJAMIN BERGER’S LAW’S RELIGION: Religious Difference and the Claims of

Constitutionalism is a remarkable work of sharp analysis and deft prose. For
readers within legal academia and practice, the book sets a challenging task:
to examine from the outside a structure in which they are sitting. The central
insight of Berger’s book is that Canadian constitutional law is a culture, a system
of symbols that structure and generate meaning, deeply influenced by a liberal
tradition and a particular history. Berger reminds us that even those who agree
with this basic proposition often find themselves speaking of law as if it were
above or without culture. Through examples drawn principally from Canadian
court decisions, Berger shows persuasively that when law encounters religion,
we witness a meeting of cultures, each with its own symbolic, aesthetic, and
normative commitments. The participants in this cross-cultural encounter,
however, are not equal in power. The law has a coercive capacity unavailable to
most religions, which sometimes makes the encounter colonial or conversionary
in character. Berger argues that this is not a problem that can be cured; law
cannot help but be a culture, and its impulse to rule is deeply ingrained. Instead,
Berger provocatively suggests that judges should cultivate their indifference to
1.
2.

(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015) [Berger].
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of New Brunswick. Thanks go to Tom
Champion for his research assistance and to Kathryn Chan for helpful comments on a
previous draft. Special thanks, as always, to Dr. Naomi Lear and Gabriel Kislowicz.
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difference, widening the spaces for minority religious practices by reading them,
where possible, as inoffensive to the state’s basic commitments. For those familiar
with Berger’s previously published work,3 some of these themes will be familiar.
Put together in this monograph, the larger arcs of Berger’s arguments come into
sharper focus as he draws out the connections between those earlier pieces. Law’s
Religion also represents a significant development of Berger’s thought on possible
responses to the more problematic aspects of law’s meeting with religion.
In what follows, I delve more deeply into three distinguishing features of
Berger’s argument. First, I discuss Berger’s methodological approach, which begins
from the lived experience of legal subjects instead of focusing on abstract ideas
of law or theory. Second, I address Berger’s exposition of the culture of Canadian
constitutional law, along with the limits and conversionary tendencies of this
culture. Third, I consider Berger’s suggested adjudicative virtues—fidelity and
humility—as a response to the difficulties encountered when law casts religion
in its own image. I conclude by suggesting that future scholarship, nurtured by
Berger’s approach, could enrich understandings by incorporating the voices and
perspectives of religious individuals and communities subject to the law’s rule.

I. METHODOLOGICAL SHIFT: FOCUS ON LIVED
EXPERIENCE, NOT LAW OR THEORY
Constitutional analysis tends to start from first principles. The terms of
constitutional rights are usually broad, and the lawyer’s instinct is to define the
terms before putting them into action in a given case.4 So it is when we turn
our imaginations to the relations between state and religion and to principles
of secularism. Berger claims that “such analysis, whose point of departure is an
ideal of ‘the secular,’ ultimately hides more than it illuminates.”5 In part, this is
because there are many varieties of secularism, each an idiosyncratic product of its
geographical, historical, and political context. More crucially for Berger, setting
up a grand theory of secularism as a point of departure tends to “strip away
3.

4.
5.

See generally Benjamin L Berger, “Law’s Religion: Rendering Culture” (2007) 45:2 Osgoode
Hall LJ 277; Benjamin L Berger, “The Cultural Limits of Legal Tolerance” (2008) 21:2
Can JL & Jur 245; Benjamin L Berger, “The Aesthetics of Religious Freedom” in Winnifred
Fallers Sullivan & Lori G Beaman, eds, Varieties of Religious Establishment (Burlington,
Vermont: Ashgate, 2013) 33.
See e.g. Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem, 2004 SCC 47, [2004] 2 SCR 551 at para 39 (Justice
Iacobucci adopts a provisional definition of religion before analyzing how the right of
religious freedom applies in a particular context).
Berger, supra note 1 at 33.
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lived experience”; the “prescriptive and explanatory breadth” of such accounts
is achieved “at the expense of regard for the messy details of wrestling with the
relationship between religion, law, and politics.”6
Instead, Berger advocates a “phenomenological turn in the study of law
and religion, one that seeks to privilege experience of the law as the analytic
starting point, rather than legal concepts or ideal forms of theory.”7 He does this
by understanding the meeting of law and religion as a cross-cultural encounter.
Such an approach does not start by defining terms or relying on metaphors
such as a wall of separation between law and religion. Instead, it investigates
the competing cultural commitments of both law and religion that are exposed
when the two meet.8

II. CULTURAL COMMITMENTS OF CANADIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In Berger’s view, law’s cultural understanding of religion has three overlapping and
mutually reinforcing elements: “(1) religion as essentially individual, (2) religion
as centrally addressed through autonomy and choice, and (3) religion as private.”9
When Canadian constitutional law explains the purpose of religious freedom,
says Berger, it focuses on the “individual’s sense of his or her own relationship
to the divine or to the object of faith,”10 and Berger finds ample support in the
case law for this claim. This individualistic orientation is consistent with the
Supreme Court of Canada’s (SCC) general approach to the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms,11 “a product of the structure and the informing [liberal]
ideology” of that document.12 This orientation can mean that some claims of
religious communities are not cognizable by courts. Berger points to the case of
Adler v Ontario as an example, in which several minority religious communities
sought provincial funding for their schools equal to that provided to Catholic

6.
7.
8.

Ibid.
Ibid at 36.
In taking this approach, Berger acknowledges the influence of Paul Kahn. See Paul W
Kahn, The Cultural Study of Law: Reconstructing Legal Scholarship (Chicago: University Of
Chicago Press, 2000).
9. Berger, supra note 1 at 66.
10. Berger, supra note 1 at 66.
11. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982
(UK), 1982, c 11.
12. Berger, supra note 1 at 72.
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schools in Ontario.13 Berger says the claim failed not only because it impugned
another constitutional provision that guaranteed Catholic school funding, but
also because the claim to community-based education does not fit within the
individualist mould.14
While Law’s Religion offers a compelling reading of Adler, that case also reveals
at least one way in which Canadian constitutional culture sometimes understands
religion in terms of communities rather than just individuals. The constitutional
protection of Catholic denominational schooling rights in Ontario is given life
through institutions. While the educational rights vest in individuals, the schools
are sites of community autonomy in a way that cannot be completely reduced
to individual rights. Indeed, in a recent case, though the majority of the SCC
declined to answer the question whether corporate bodies can claim religious
freedom rights, a Catholic school (rather than any individual) was granted a
remedy in the name of religious freedom, and a concurring minority held that
religious schools and other organizations could bear rights of religious freedom.15
This said, Berger’s claim about the strong pull of individualism is well
demonstrated through other examples. According to Berger, law’s concern
with autonomy predisposes courts to understand religion as something made
meaningful in a person’s life principally because it is chosen. Though some say that
contemporary religious freedom jurisprudence has shifted from a concern with
freedom toward a preoccupation with identity16 or equality,17 Berger argues that
law ultimately justifies its concern with identity-related harms by focusing on the
autonomy of the identity-bearer.18 So, when Jehovah’s Witness parents made a
religious freedom claim against a state decision to require a blood transfusion for
their baby, the SCC was unanimous that the decision did not violate the Charter,

13. Adler v Ontario, [1996] 3 SCR 609, 140 DLR (4th) 385.
14. Berger, supra note 1 at 74.
15. See Loyola High School v Quebec (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 12 at paras 33-34, 89-102,
[2015] 1 SCR 613. To be clear, Berger is careful to recognize that Canadian constitutional
law has some regard for collective dimensions of religious practice. His claim, more finely
put, is that “wherever else its eyes might wander, in the contemporary treatment of religious
liberties, Canadian constitutional law invariably returns to a sharp focus on the individual”
(Berger, supra note 1 at 68-69).
16. Richard Moon, “Religious Commitment and Identity: Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem”
(2005) 29 SCLR (2d) 201.
17. Mary Anne Waldron, Free to Believe: Rethinking Freedom of Conscience and Religion in Canada
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013).
18. Berger, supra note 1 at 87-88.
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and one of the concurring judgments justified this result through its preservation
of the child’s autonomy in choosing her faith until she developed that capacity.19
Finally, Berger claims that law relegates religious commitment to the private
sphere, a domain “in which we are governed in our actions and dispositions
not by the universalism of reason but by the particularities of love, preference,
and belief.”20 This orientation helps make sense of the distinction the court
has drawn between religious belief and practice.21 “As belief only, religion is a
preference that remains solidly and unproblematically within the realm of the
personal. As conduct, it might seep into the realm of the public where interest
and preference have a troublesome status.”22
The Court drew the belief/conduct distinction in a case addressing Trinity
Western University’s (TWU) Community Covenant, which prohibited students
from engaging in same-sex or unmarried sexual intimacy (among other things).
In the absence of evidence supporting the British Columbia College of Teachers’
claim that graduates of TWU’s education program would likely discriminate
against LGBTQI students once in the classroom, the Court held that the College
of Teachers penalized TWU on the basis of (private) belief rather than (public)
conduct. But the Community Covenant can equally be understood as a religious
practice that crosses into the public realm when TWU seeks accreditation by a
public regulator. In fact, now that TWU has proposed establishing a law school
while still retaining a similar Community Covenant, this has been an argument
pursued with mixed success by the law societies of British Columbia, Ontario,
and Nova Scotia, in denying accreditation.23 The differing results of these cases
support Berger’s argument that law is hospitable to religious difference only
when the religion can be understood as private. In one of the cases where TWU
was successful, the court held that “[p]ermitting TWU graduates to article in

19. RB v Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1995] 1 SCR 315, 122 DLR (4th) at
para 230 [Children’s Aid Society]; Berger, supra note 1 at 90.
20. Ibid at 91.
21. Trinity Western University v College of Teachers (British Columbia), 2001 SCC 31 at para 36,
[2001] 1 SCR 772.
22. Berger, supra note 1 at 94.
23. Trinity Western University v The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONSC 4250 (Div Ct),
aff’d 2016 ONCA 518, 398 DLR (4th) 489 [TWU v LSUC]; Trinity Western University v The
Law Society of British Columbia, 2015 BCSC 2326, 392 DLR (4th) 722, aff’d 2016 BCCA
423; Trinity Western University v Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society, 2015 NSSC 25, aff’d 2016
NSCA 59, 401 DLR (4th) 56 [TWU v Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society].
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Nova Scotia will not open the door to discrimination in Nova Scotia.”24 In other
words, there will not be public consequences, at least in the province of the
regulator’s jurisdiction. In contrast, in the case where TWU was unsuccessful,
the court reasoned that the law society, as a gatekeeper of the legal profession and
an entity subject to Ontario’s human rights legislation, could take into account
the discriminatory nature of TWU’s Community Covenant. In this view, the
Community Covenant’s impact reverberates into the public sphere, and can thus
not be tolerated when it conflicts with one of law’s values (non-discrimination).25
Indeed, Berger says that “the extent and character of legal tolerance
for religion may turn on a religion’s conformity with the law’s conceptual
commitments about religion.”26 When courts ask “if a limit on religious freedom
is justified, the question is assessed within the values, assumptions, and symbolic
commitments of the culture of Canadian constitutionalism itself.”27 Courts wind
up assessing the tolerability of a religious practice based on their culturally infused
understanding of how religion works and why it is valuable, focusing on how the
practice relates to individual autonomy and whether its implications were private
or public.28 So, when a religious practice can be digested as consistent with
law’s cultural commitments, such as a Sikh high school student choosing to wear
his kirpan, the cultural difference is more likely to be tolerated.29 In contrast,
the Jehovah’s Witness parents discussed above, who sought to prevent a blood
transfusion for their infant child, “found the limit of legal tolerance at the border
of individual autonomy and choice.”30 While religious views may be permitted
in public discussions of school board policies, they are intolerable when they
fail to comply with the cultural values of inclusion and equality.31 The message
of the cases, says Berger, is that law behaves as if it meets an equal partner in
cross-cultural exchange only when law’s fundamental values are respected. When
they are not, law will impose its will in a more conversionary kind of encounter.32
24. TWU v Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society, ibid at para 253. The Court of Appeal upheld the
decision on administrative law grounds, holding that the Barristers’ Society had overstepped
its jurisdiction by arrogating to itself the power to determine whether a university had
engaged in unlawful discrimination.
25. See TWU v LSUC, supra note 23 at paras 130–35 (Divisional Court reasons), 118-19, 138
(Court of Appeal reasons).
26. Berger, supra note 1 at 101.
27. Ibid at 117.
28. Ibid at 118.
29. Multani v Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, 2006 SCC 6, [2006] 1 SCR 256.
30. Berger, supra note 1 at 123; Children’s Aid Society, supra note 19.
31. Chamberlain v Surrey School District No 36, 2002 SCC 86, [2002] 4 SCR 710.
32. Berger, supra note 1 at 126.
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For Berger, law’s conversionary impulse is not something that actors in
Canada’s legal system can change. While some might hope that law and religion
could meet as mutually respecting partners in dialogue, each learning and growing
from its engagement with the other, Berger concludes that “[t]he distinctive
character of the culture of contemporary constitutionalism… precludes [this]
kind of dialogical engagement.”33 For those committed to building a pluralistic
society where minority groups are respected precisely for their cultural difference
this sounds like depressing news. But in his final argumentative manoeuvre, Berger
provides an intriguing response: those who care deeply about the merits of cultural
diversity should work on getting courts to care less about cultural difference.

III. HUMILITY, FIDELITY, AND EXPANDING INDIFFERENCE
Taking seriously the idea that law and religion meet as two distinct cultures means,
for Berger, that judges should be at once more faithful to the culture of Canadian
constitutional law and humbler about law’s assumed exclusivity in generating
norms and meaning in the lives of individuals and communities. Berger argues
that, though in tension, the virtues of fidelity and humility will allow judges to
leave more space for alternate cultural forms that can be interpreted as not in
conflict with state values.
Judges can accomplish this, says Berger, by being more transparent about the
cultural commitments of law. If judges imagine law as a culture rather than as
above culture, they can lay down the impossible burden of “juridically solving the
cultural tensions between law and religion.”34 Instead, judges can react to cultural
difference by “[staying] the violent hand of the law,” expanding the array of
religious practices to which law is indifferent, marking them as “not intolerable.”35
And even when law determines that a practice is beyond the boundaries of its
toleration, a judge who understands such determinations as stemming from
cultural differences will explain a litigant’s loss by “gesturing to a reason other
than the inability of the individual to participate in a rational community.”36
One example Berger uses to show this ethic in action is Justice Abella’s
dissenting judgment in Hutterian Brethren.37 In assessing the litigants’ objection
33.
34.
35.
36.

Ibid at 139.
Ibid at 177.
Ibid at 177-78.
Ibid at 187. For an example of this form of reasoning, see Berger’s discussion of Justice
Binnie’s dissenting view in Children’s Aid Society, supra note 19 at 174-75.
37. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony v Alberta, 2009 SCC 37 at paras 110-77,
[2009] 2 SCR 567.
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to being photographed, Justice Abella is faithful to the culture of constitutional
law by understanding the claim in terms of autonomy, focusing on whether the
legislation left the colony with a meaningful choice between religious observance
and civil obedience. Having done so, she “provides a sterling example of the
cultivation of indifference” by emphasizing the minimal impact that would have
been occasioned by the colony’s desired accommodation, concluding that the law
should not be bothered by it.38

IV. WHERE TO FROM HERE?
Berger’s resolve to find a new entry point to analyzing the relations between
law and religion yields a subtle and well-supported account of why the tensions
between them seem intractable. Berger exemplifies the virtue of humility by not
claiming to have found a new way to end these conflicts. Instead, he encourages
his readers to inhabit them faithfully, humbly, and honestly. While law’s colonial
impulse may never be completely stayed, Berger offers hope that it can at least be
tamed. For those who find Berger’s account convincing, there is much work to
be done. As discussed above, Berger insists on an approach focused on the lived
experience of legal subjects rather than grand questions of theory or overarching
legal doctrine. Though Berger’s accounts of the religious practices at the centre
of some disputes are moving,39 we cannot know how deeply they resonate with
the lived experience of religious practitioners until we hear their stories in their
own voices. One way of doing this is to ask them, in interviews, to give their
own accounts;40 a less direct way is to examine the written and oral arguments
advanced on their behalf.41 Berger’s account is rich, and worth reading carefully.
Future studies could build on its foundations by drawing on the practical
methodologies of cultural anthropology that inspired some of Berger’s thinking.

38. Berger, supra note 1 at 184.
39. See the discussion of the eruv and the succah (ibid at 43-45).
40. See e.g. Angela Campbell, “Bountiful Voices” (2009) 47:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 183; Anne Saris
& Jean-Mathieu Potvin, “Canadian Muslim Women and Resolution of Family Conflicts:
An Empirical Qualitative Study (2005-2007)” in Silvio Ferrari & Rinaldo Cristofori, eds,
Law and Religion in the 21st Century (Surrey, BC: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2010) 339;
Howard Kislowicz, “Sacred Laws in Earthly Courts: Legal Pluralism in Canadian Religious
Freedom Litigation” (2013) 39:1 Queen’s LJ 175.
41. For one example, see the discussion of Amish litigation in Robert Cover, “Nomos and
Narrative” in Martha Minow, Michael Ryan & Austin Sarat, eds, Narrative, Violence, and the
Law: The Essays of Robert Cover (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992) at 95.

